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A common thread across the ﬁ nancial system’s 
evolution is the quest to be located for tax and 
regulatory purposes elsewhere or, ideally, no-
where.  Dynamics and behaviour associated with 
human failure (greed, exuberance, fraud, incom-
petence) should best be understood as sabo-
tage. Finance is awash with techniques designed 
to sabotage clients and governments. These 
techniques are legal, albeit, as Veblen writes, not 
in the spirit of the law.
Introduction 
To what extent is i nance distinct from other spheres of 
economic activity? What is it about the global i nancial 
system that makes it so heavily reliant on obscure and 
opaque practices and spaces, such as of shore i nancial 
havens, shadow banking entities, and specially designed 
products and innovations? h is article aims to address 
these questions drawing on the insights originally con-
ceived in the old tradition of American institutional eco-
nomics and developed specii cally in the scholarship of 
h orstein Veblen. 
h orsten Veblen was a prominent evolutionary 
thinker whose work has not received its due attention. 
Veblen’s key insight into the study of modern capitalism 
focused on the dichotomy between ‘the alleged impera-
tives of workmanlike industry’ and of predatory ‘business’ 
(Hodgson 2004, 202). In particular, he argued that ‘any 
intrusion of business strategy into the conduct of industry 
will be sabotage’ (Veblen 1923, 278, cited in Hodgson 
2004, 203). An evolutionary thinker, Veblen inquired 
into causal explanation of the developments in industry 
and business; he understood that once a particular prac-
tice becomes successful, others will follow suit. Focusing 
on two major developments in the i nancial system that 
have been brought up by the global crisis of 2007-09, 
we advance Veblen’s notion of business sabotage to the 
sphere of i nance to explain why the rather obscure and 
opaque systems of tax havens and shadow banking have 
come to play a central role in contemporary capitalism. 
Since World War 2, the i nancial system has gone 
through a number of phases and transformative mo-
ments. Yet if we were to identify one common thread 
across its stages of evolution, it is the quest for being lo-
cated for tax and regulatory purposes elsewhere or, ideally 
nowhere (Palan 2010) (Urry Forthcoming). What does 
this mean? h e main structural development in i nance 
has been the emergence and persistent growth of new le-
gal or quasi-legal spaces and i nancial innovations which 
were either aimed at and/or resulted in the avoidance or 
minimization of state regulations. h e trend began most 
markedly with the emergence of the Euromarkets in the 
late 1950s in London, and strengthened with the devel-
opment of shadow banking industry in the later part of 
that century. 
Since the late 1950s, the i nancial system has devel-
oped an alternative conduit space that transcends national 
regulations known as the Euromarkets, or the of shore 
i nancial market. h e Euromarkets host transactions de-
nominated in currencies other than that of jurisdiction in 
which the market is located. Originally, it traded dollars 
seeking to escape attempts by the United States to assert 
control over the use of its currency. In our terms, the 
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Euromarkets were a precursor to the now omnipotent 
phenomena of of shore i nance. Of shore i nance refers 
to very specii c wholesale i nancial markets, known oth-
erwise as the Euromarkets that emerged originally in the 
late 1950s in London that were largely unregulated (Pa-
lan 2003). In one way or another, about half of the global 
stock of money passes through of shore jurisdictions. At 
the same time, approximately one third of all global FDI 
passes through these jurisdictions (Palan, Murphy & 
Chavagneux 2010). Recent estimates place the amount 
of accumulated private wealth registered in of shore ha-
vens in excess of $US 21 trillion, or at nearly 18% of the 
aggregate global wealth (Henri 2012). 
More recently, the global i nancial crisis of 2007-09 
revealed the scale of another set of alternative conduit 
spaces and entities, collectively known as ‘shadow bank-
ing’ (SB). SB consists of a complex network of i nancial 
intermediation that takes place of  the balance sheets of 
the regulated banks, and thus remains largely invisible 
to regulatory bodies. In the USA on the eve of the crisis, 
the scale of the shadow banking industry was estimated 
to be one and a half times larger than the oi  cial, ‘vis-
ible’ banking sector. In Europe, recent estimates suggest 
that SB practices have actually grown in scope after the 
crisis of 2007-09, while other studies suggest that SB has 
historically played an important role in the i nancing of 
the economy in emerging markets (Ghosh et al 2012; 
Bakk-Simon et al. 2012). h e two intertwined phenom-
ena of of shore i nancial centres (OFCs) and SB are now 
drawing the attention of global and national regulators 
(BIS 2009). We suggest this attention should be guided 
by the insight that both are dei ned by the search for be-
ing not quite anywhere. 
What drives the quest of i nancial actors for relo-
cation to such spaces? Standard economics approaches 
this question from a rather conventional angle. Eco-
nomic agents seek spaces that facilitate the ei  ciency of 
the market’s capacity to allocate resources, and ensure a 
minimum of state interference with this process. State 
interference, in turn, tends to distort markets and hin-
ders ei  ciency. Actors would naturally shift operations 
to spaces which fuli lled these requirements. h e Veble-
nian approach, known otherwise as the Old Institutional 
Economics (OIE), tackles the question from a dif erent 
angle. In what follows, we focus on one key element in 
Veblen’s thought that can serve, we argue, as the basis 
for an alternative ‘macro theory’ of i nance, but which 
has not garnered sui  cient attention to date. h is may 
be largely because it is rather simple and obvious. Veblen 
argued that the modern economy, that is, the economy 
that he witnessed taking shape in the late 19th century 
U.S., and that has been internationalized since, was dom-
inated by the personality of the businessman, the principal 
‘habit of thought’ of whom in terms of their outlook 
on proi t-making enterprise was, according to Veblen, 
the technique of sabotage. For Veblen it is the i gure of 
the businessman, as opposed to the capitalist in Marx-
ist framework, who provided a better understanding of 
trends and developments in the modern economy. h e 
Veblenian approach assumes that i nance is a component 
of business culture that does not seek improvement in ef-
i ciency and delivery per se. Instead, the logic of i nance is 
the logic of sabotage. In this perspective, i nancial actors 
operate at the very edge of the law, in the twilight zone, 
in an area that may be still legal, yet not in the spirit of the 
law. In this article, we employ the Veblenian framework 
to examine some of the causes behind the emergence of 
twilight zones in the global i nancial system and indeed, 
explain why the institution of i nance itself has become 
a twilight zone. 
h e Challenge of ‘Elsewhere’: Shadow Banking 
and Of shore Finance 
h e phenomena of shadow banking and of shore i nance 
have quite distinct trajectories in contemporary i nancial 
discourse and academic debates. h e problem of tax ha-
vens had been known for a long while; it has generated 
a range of work in International Political Economy and 
related disciplines (see for example Palan 2003; Burn 
2005; Palan et al. 2010; Sharman 2006; 2011) and in-
spired a network of civil society organisations aiming to 
redress the socio-economic injustices that spur from the 
existence of tax havens, such as Tax Justice Network, UK 
Uncut, Finance Watch, Public Finance International etc. 
(see Seabrooke & Wigan 2013). 
h e term ‘shadow banking’ in contrast, is relatively 
new. h e concept of shadow banking is commonly cred-
ited to Paul McCulley, then of PIMCO, who in a 2007 
speech to the Federal Reserve Conference in Jackson 
Hole observed that the (then unfolding) i nancial crisis 
could be attributed to the growth of „unregulated shadow 
banks that (unlike regulated banks), fund themselves with 
uninsured short-term funding, which may or may not be 
backstopped by liquidity lines from real banks. Because 
they l y below the radar of traditional bank regulation, 
these levered-up intermediaries operate in the shadows 
without backstopping from the Fed’s discount lending 
window or access to FDIC (Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation) deposit insurance“ (McCulley 2009, 257). 
Indeed, the crisis of 2007-09 was in many accounts a 
crisis of shadow credit facilities, shadow i nancial entities 
and shadow liquidity. 
At the same time however, the two phenomena are 
not only closely connected with each other functionally, 
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but combined, represent a signii cant part of the global i -
nancial space. Finance has evolved in a way that until very 
recently had not been accounted for in any systematic 
way. We suggest that underlying the evolution of of shore 
i nancial havens and the shadow banking universe has 
been the factor of ‘elsewhere’: the principle of not being 
recognised, registered, accounted for, taxed, regulated, 
detected or understood well, has been the engine being 
the growth of the of shore political economy (Palan et al. 
2010), and has provided the fuel for much of i nancial in-
novation that culminated in the emergence of the shadow 
banking industry. 
While the concept of ‘elsewhere’ and even ‘nowhere’ is 
well-established in the study of the emergence of of shore 
i nance (Murphy 2009), it has not been widely used in the 
analyses of shadow banking. At the same time, emergent 
literature on shadow banking has gone a long way in 
explaining in some detail the core functions that shadow 
banking entities perform in the credit intermediation 
process. Underpinning these functions, we argue, is the 
ability of i nancial agents to carve out i nancial and legal 
spaces that remain unaccounted for by existing regula-
tions, control systems and academic paradigms. Under-
standing shadow banking and of shore i nance, therefore, 
implies recognising that credit and consequently, ‘money’ 
today can be created out of the sheer idea of ‘elsewhere,’ 
or better, ‘nowhere.’ Being and operating ‘elsewhere’ in 
relation to one’s oi  cial balance sheet or using facilities 
that are registered ‘elsewhere’ for taxation and regula-
tory purposes and are as a result, accountable to no one, 
has become an important tool of innovation for i nancial 
agents today. In other words, as we argue here, being 
located ‘elsewhere’ in the global economy, the systems of 
shadow banking system and of shore i nance have come 
to play a crucial role in the contemporary i nancial sys-
tem. h is realisation presents both academic and regula-
tory challenges to i nance scholars and policy-makers. In 
what follows, we address the conceptual dimensions of 
this problem. 
Finance as Business: Lessons from Veblen 
How can the notion and functions of ‘elsewhere’ in the 
world economy be understood? Mainstream economics 
of ers two contrasting angles on this question. On the one 
hand, often being linked with illicit i nancial dealings 
and activities, the systems of shadow banking and tax 
havens can be regarded as aberrations and disruptions of 
normal economic and business activity. Some commenta-
tors view the phenomenon of shadow banking as para-
normal development in the global economy, often link-
ing it to tax evasion emanating from the underground or 
unaccounted economy and read derogatory connotations 
into the practices of shadow banking (Buehn & Schnei-
der 2011). Elsewhere and nowhere in other words, simply 
do not exist in many orthodox models of economic and 
behaviour, they are assumed away.
On the other hand, economic theory has no particu-
lar dii  culties explaining individual economic unit’s ra-
tionale for operating in these alternative spaces. As proi t 
maximizing units, it is entirely predictable, indeed, in-
cumbent, upon those units to employ legal devices that 
serve their ultimate goal, which proi t is. In competitive 
market conditions, business would innovate new products 
and even markets in order to gain a competitive position. 
Of shore i nance and shadow banking are expressions, 
therefore, of i nancial markets doing what they do best - 
allocating resources in the most ei  cient way available. In 
particular, most commentators note the very central role 
that key functions that shadow banking – risk, maturity 
and liquidity transformation – performs in today’s i nan-
cial system. Whereas the existence of of shore i nancial 
centres has typically been interpreted as a healthy element 
in tax optimisation by competitive economic agents. 
h orstein Veblen, (Veblen, 2001 [1921]) (Veblen, 
1923) who may be considered the leading light in this 
approach, drew his primary data from Congressional 
Committees reports of late 19th and early 20th century 
that focused on the predatory practices of American busi-
nesses. Veblen concluded on the basis of these reports 
that the central i gure in modern capitalism was neither 
the rational consumer of standard economics, nor the 
capitalist as owner of the means of production of Marxist 
theory, but rather, the i gure of the businessman. Busi-
nessmen were individuals, he argued, with no special-
ized expertise in production, manufacturing, services or 
management. h ey were experts in ‘the art of buying and 
selling’. Veblen’s theory amounted in essence, to generali-
zations of the likely behavioural patterns of the business-
men, as purveyors and traders in property rights under 
diverse environmental conditions. Following Veblen, in 
our analysis of i nance we propose to start from a simple 
and straightforward premise. Namely, that banks, as well 
as the various departments and desks that banks are made 
of, tend to think and behave like businesses, and they see 
their interest and function exclusively in pecuniary terms. 
What does the concept of bank as a business enter-
prise entail? First and foremost, businesses are concerned 
with pecuniary gains. h is idea appears self-evident, but 
its implications run deep. Veblen believed that far from 
embracing competitive markets, businesses were con-
cerned by the state of equilibrium conditions described 
in standard economics, since open and ‘fair’ competi-
tion inevitably would result in wafer-thin proi ts, if any. 
Businessmen in fact complained about ‘ruinous compe-
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tition,’ and devised an impressive array of techniques, 
documented in the various Congressional Reports of late 
19th century, that were intended to ensure that the free 
market of standard economics did not apply to their busi-
nesses. Best known of these devices were monopolies and 
cartels, but according to Veblen, these were only the tip 
of a very large iceberg. 
 Veblen used a generic term to describe the business-
man’s techniques for proi t generation as ‘sabotage’. Sabo-
tage was, in his words, ‘the deliberate, although entirely 
legal, practice of peaceful restriction, delay, withdrawal, 
or obstruction used to secure some special advantage or 
preference’ (Veblen, 2001 [1921], 4). Sabotage, he argued, 
„commonly works within the law, although it may often 
be within the letter rather than the spirit of the law. It 
is used to secure some special advantage or preference, 
usually of a business-like sort. It commonly has to do 
with something in the nature of a vested right, which 
one or another of the parties in the case aims to secure 
or defend, or to defeat or diminish“ (Veblen 2001 [1921], 
6). Businessmen, Veblen argued, would deliberately seek 
to disorient their competitors by restructuring and re-or-
ganizing the world around them in ways that would sabo-
tage their clients, competitors and/or the governments. 
Mainstream economics does accommodate the pecu-
niary principle and techniques of sabotage: economists 
habitually argue that capitalists are in the business of 
maximizing proi ts. But they tend to argue that it is the 
governments that, due to their very nature, sabotage busi-
ness, or function as rent-seeking enterprises that damage 
the market. In arguing that however, economists tend 
to neglect two related factors. First, that there are many 
good reasons for business to and try and sabotage their 
own governments as well (let alone other governments, 
often with the aid of their own). Not least among these 
reasons is the fact that the government is both an abso-
lute and necessary requirement for the economy to oper-
ate. But government is expensive. Hence, businessmen 
use sabotaging techniques as a redistribution tool – in 
order to ensure that while benei ts of government ac-
crue to business, costs fall elsewhere. To use conventional 
language therefore, we need to recognize that it is not 
only governments that are rent-seeking, but businesses 
themselves are rent-seeking enterprises. Veblen’s theory 
predicts that whenever rent-seeking opportunities arise, 
business will tend to grab those. h e most likely source 
of rent-seeking opportunities, in turn, is the state and 
the law. 
Second, modelled on abstraction, economic theory 
neglects to ask whether businesses seek to maximize pre-
tax or post-tax proi ts. Considering that corporate taxa-
tion in many OECD countries may reach 30 or even 40 
per cent of declared pre-tax proi ts, this is not a trivial 
question. Maximization of pre-tax proi ts tells us next to 
nothing about what businesses, and in particular, their 
owners and share-holders, truly care about, which is 
post-tax proi ts. h eoretically, the dif erence may appear 
marginal. It is not. h e quest for post-tax proi ts has led 
to the development of a service economy with lucrative 
lines in tax and regulatory avoidance. h is service sec-
tor, run by highly skilled professionals such as lawyers 
and accountants, is now so large and sophisticated that 
it functions as an economy in and by itself. Politically, it 
has also emerged as a powerful international lobby group. 
It is a service economy that is founded on the desire of 
economic agents to avoid or evade taxation or regulations. 
h e main source of income to this service economy is 
the business of avoidance and evasion. At the same time, 
the development of of shore i nancial markets since the 
late 1950s demonstrates that the business of avoidance 
has reached industrial proportions, and has become one 
of the key technique for sabotaging the state as well, a 
process that Veblen did not address in his original writ-
ings. h is industry of regulatory avoidance, facilitated 
and dependent on locations and services ‘elsewhere’ and 
otherwise known as i nancial innovation, is now consid-
ered one of the main functions of international i nance. 
Regulatory bodies are only beginning to take account on 
these trends. 
To over-simplify somewhat, the rise of the of shore 
world and the shadow banking industry can be seen as a 
history of the discovery, often by accident, of opportuni-
ties for sabotage, including sabotaging the state. 
Shadow Banking and Of shore Finance 
h e complex and still little understood system of shadow 
banks, i nancial-legal entities and their connections are 
one of the most challenging outcomes of the post-war 
i nancial evolution and more specii cally, of the endog-
enous process of i nancial evolution. Narrow dei nitions 
of this phenomenon describe shadow banking as mar-
ket-based (as opposed to bank-based) ways of funding 
i nancial transactions, or in other words, ‘money market 
funding of capital market lending’ (Mehrling et al. 2012). 
More inclusive dei nitions suggest that shadow banking 
is simply, ‘credit extension outside of the banking system’ 
(FSB 2012). h e i gures for the shadow banking industry 
are staggering. According to the data from the Federal 
Reserve, in 2007, on the eve of the global i nancial melt-
down, the size of shadow banking in the USA was $18 
trillion, or $6 trillion above the volume of the regulated 
banking system. In the aftermath of the crisis, the size 
of shadow banking system has decreased to an estimated 
$15.8 trillion (Pozsar et al. 2010). Recent data from the 
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Financial Stability Board (FSB) puts the size of the global 
shadow banking system at around $67 trillion at the end 
of 2011, or roughly a third of the world i nancial system. 
Modern tax havens have existed since the early twen-
tieth century. h ey were used, and are still being used, 
primarily but not exclusively, for tax evasion and avoid-
ance purposes. Tax havens are also used however, for 
other purposes. Since the early 1960s, all the premier 
tax havens of the world have developed i nancial centres 
known otherwise as Of shore Financial Centres (OFC). 
It is estimated that about half of all international lending 
and deposits originated in OFCs, of which approximately 
half again are located in OFCs that double as tax havens. 
h e Bank of International Settlements (BIS) statistics of 
international assets and liabilities ranks the Cayman Is-
lands as fourth largest international i nancial centre in 
the world, while other well-known tax havens/OFCs, 
such as Switzerland (7th) the Netherlands (8th), Ireland 
(9th), Singapore 10th, Luxembourg (11th), Bahamas (15th) 
and Jersey 19th are lower in the ranking. In addition these 
centres are recipients of approximately 30% of world’s 
share of FDI, and in turn, are the originators of similar 
amounts of FDIs (Palan, Murphy & Chavagneux 2010).
h ere is some confusion between the concept of tax 
havens and OFCs, and is not only a matter of semantics. 
h e contrasting views of the role of tax havens as OFCs 
derive to a degree from the dif erent understandings of 
nature of the of shore i nancial markets, the Euromar-
kets. Some economists believe that the Euromarkets is 
simply a wholesale i nancial market for U.S. dollar that 
emerged in Europe in the 1950s (Schenk 1998). A very 
dif erent theory claims that the Euromarkets is a very 
specii c type of market that emerged in late 1957 in Lon-
don (Burn 2005). According to this theory, the Bank of 
England came to an informal agreement with the City’s 
merchant banks to treat certain types of i nancial trans-
actions between non-resident parties and denominated 
in foreign currency as if they did not take place in Lon-
don, even though they were in London. Paradoxically, the 
bank created, in ef ect, a new regulatory space outside its 
jurisdiction, and a new concept – of shore i nance. But as 
the transactions that took place in London were deemed 
by the Bank of England to be taking place elsewhere, they 
ended up under no regulation at all, or of shore. h ese 
transactions, according to this theory, take place in a new 
unregulated space called the Euromarkets, or the of shore 
i nancial market (Burn 2005). 
As far as we can tell, the original rationale for the 
development of the Euromarkets had little to do with 
taxation. British banks developed the market as a way of 
coping with the new regulation imposed by the British 
Treasury that prevented British banks temporarily form 
lending in the non-Sterling area, apparently with the 
compliance of the Bank of England. As long as the Eu-
romarkets served that very specii c purpose, it remained 
small and practically unknown for three or four years. 
Soon, however, U.S. banks discovered the market as well, 
and they discovered, moreover, that the market can be 
used to sabotage their own government’s regulations. 
h is was the reason for its spectacular development. 
Having learned of the new facility of ered by London, 
some of the leading US banks rapidly developed a branch 
network in London beginning in the early 1960s. h ey 
were not motivated by tax – taxation in the UK was 
particularly high at that time. h ey were interested in 
Euromarkets facilities in order to circumvent stringent 
U.S. banking and i nancial regulations. In Veblenian lan-
guage, they set up branches in London, to sabotage their 
own government’s regulatory ef orts. 
In parallel, in the 1950s, US multinationals began 
to expand their international operations. Once they dis-
covered the facility of the Euromarkets, corporate clients 
began to bypass the banks and tap directly into the Euro-
markets to earn higher rates of interest while also looking 
to the same Euromarkets to fund their operations (Burn 
2005; Sylla 2002). To stem the l ow, in 1963 the Kennedy 
administration proposed an Interest Equalization Tax to 
ensure that U.S. citizens did not get preferential interest 
in the European markets. h e results, predictably, were 
the opposite of what was intended. Instead of stemming 
the l ow of capital out of the U.S., American corporations 
kept capital abroad to avoid paying the interest equaliza-
tion tax, fuelling in the process the growth of the Euro-
markets. U.S. banks soon learned that the unregulated 
environment in London allowed them (or their London 
branches) to circumvent all the New Deal regulations. 
h ey were able, therefore, to establish large diverse banks 
in London, capable of competing in every aspect of i -
nance. German and Japanese banks then followed suit.
We also know from various reports that some of the 
smaller U.S. and Canadian banks faced with the high 
infrastructural costs of a London base, realized that the 
Caribbean OFCs of ered a cheaper and equally attrac-
tive regulatory environment – free of exchange controls, 
reserve requirements and interest rate ceilings, and in 
the same time zone as New York. According to various 
reports (Sylla 2002), the early spill over of OFCs activi-
ties into the Bahamas and Cayman was, like the London 
Euromarkets, not motivated by tax advantages, but be-
cause it was cheaper to set up branches in these locations. 
h ey had an additional advantage of sharing New York’s 
time zone. h is explains why smaller U.S. and Cana-
dian banks were at the forefront of establishing Cayman’s 
OFC and why some experts use the short hand descrip-
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tion that the U.S. and Canadian banks ‘established’ the 
Caribbean havens. h e of shore i nancial system emerged 
and l ourished largely, therefore, as mechanism of regula-
tory avoidance on a massive scale. h e notion of being 
‘elsewhere’ for regulatory and tax purposes has been a 
necessary condition for this development, often leading 
to i nancial transactions being in fact regulated nowhere.
h ese observations bring us to the more well-re-
hearsed arguments about lack of transparency in mod-
ern i nance (Best 2004). Secrecy, lack of transparency, 
complexity and opaqueness has become essential ingre-
dients of today’s i nancial innovation, yet for dif erent 
reasons than traditionally assumed. While of shore i -
nance has often being linked to illicit i nancial l ows and 
money laundering (Sharman 2011), and while the notion 
of shadow banking often relates this phenomena to the 
underground or grey areas of economic activity, the real 
signii cance of shadow banking and of shore i nance is 
that they function as important ‘black holes’ in the global 
economy. As Murphy explains, a misconception about 
i nancial complexity and secrecy today is the assumption 
that the secrecy world is geographically located. It is not. 
As he writes, „it is instead a space that has no specii c 
location. h is space is created by tax haven legislation 
which assumes that the entities registered in such places 
are ‘elsewhere’ for operational purposes, i.e. they do not 
trade within the domain of the tax haven, and no infor-
mation is sought about where trade actually occurs.“ As 
he continues, „to locate these transactions in a place is 
not only impossible in many cases, it is also futile: they 
are not intended to be and cannot be located in that way. 
h ey l oat over and around the locations which are used 
to facilitate their existence as if in an unregulated ether“ 
(Murphy 2009, 2). 
Recent i nancial history suggests therefore, that while 
‘elsewhere’ has been paramount to the emergence of the 
global i nancial system and its key nodes, the shadow 
banking system i rmly linked together the idea of ‘else-
where’ and ‘nowhere’ not simply for the conduct of i -
nancial transactions, but for the very process of credit 
creation as well. h e two black holes of of shore i nance 
and shadow banking have become functionally central to 
the daily operation of the global i nancial system. 
‘Elsewhere’ and Sabotaging the State 
h e brief history of of shore i nance sketched out ear-
lier in this article illustrates the importance of spatial, 
geographical and political dif erentiation in modern i -
nance. Trading essentially in incorporeal property titles, 
debt and risk instruments and the like, the i nancial sys-
tem can operate in one location, say London, but then 
register the transaction in another location. h is practice 
skews oi  cial locational statistics of i nancial activities. In 
the mid- to late 1990s, a wave of securitization became 
the major catalyst to the growth of the shadow banking 
system. Under the existing rules, if banks wanted to en-
gage in a new segment of activities such as for instance, 
the subprime mortgage market, and thus take on more 
risk, they needed more regulatory capital to account for 
these risks. h e Holy Grail of i nancial innovation came 
in 1994-95, when a technique that would later become 
known as collateralized debt obligation (CDO) was in-
vented (Tett 2009). h e instrument allowed banks (JP 
Morgan initially) to insure the risk of default of a corpo-
rate client and move it elsewhere (sell to a third party, in 
this case AIG). Soon enough the technique was extended 
to mortgage products and specii cally, to subprime mort-
gages and eventually, other types of unsecured debt. h e 
practice, now centered on several types of risk trade, reli-
ance on wholesale market funding (or shadow banks) for 
loans, and of shore i nancial jurisdictions for the legal 
architecture of the complex chain of securitization, al-
lowed more risk-prone i nancial institutions to sabotage 
their more conservative competitors. On the surface, the 
mechanism appeared as the perfect example of innova-
tion in the i nancial market producing ei  ciencies in in-
termediation between savers and borrowers. h e reality 
was quite dif erent: the expanding bubble economy and 
the shadow banking system were bound to implode.
Was the recent wave of i nancial innovation and se-
curitization an act of i nancial sabotage? Was it a de-
liberate action aimed at proi t making through subver-
sion, obstruction, disruption or destruction? It is possible 
to argue, as many economists do, that the concept of a 
mortgage-backed security (MBS) or asset-backed security 
(ABS) is a good one, as it ensures continuing liquidity in 
the housing market. A CDO too, is a brilliant invention 
as it allows banks to free up capital to employ it more 
productively. But at the same time, the good rational ac-
tor of standard i nancial economics should have been very 
careful in dabbling in securitization and re-securitization 
during ‘good times’. h e key function of banking insti-
tutions, after all, is to ensure the smooth and ei  cient 
intermediation between savers and borrowers. h ey were 
playing with other people’s money and should have been 
prudent in doing so. In the boom decades of i nancial 
innovation, rational actors were swamped by the bullish 
ones, and subsequently suf ered losses. 
It is interesting to note that the language of sabo-
taging the state is also associated with another develop-
ment of innovation driven i nance. Nigel Lawson, former 
UK Chancellor of the Exchequer under h atcher and 
member of the House of Lords selected to sit on a par-
liamentary investigation into the Libor-rigging scandal 
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said on the leading BBC program, Newsnight, 30/01/13, 
that „structured i nancial vehicles is an euphemism for 
tax avoidance.“ Lawson has a point. A good number of 
Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) were registered of shore, 
presumably to obtain what a BIS study described as ‘tax 
neutrality’ – or facilitate tax avoidance in layman’s terms 
(BIS 2009). Everyone loves the idea: those who gained 
from the facility of tax neutrality (i.e. avoidance, or sab-
otaging your own government) clearly did. h ose who 
bought the products assumed they were getting better 
deals as the sellers were not burdened by taxation. h ose 
who provided the facility happily charged for the service. 
Let us consider the nature of a not atypical Cayman 
registered set of Special Purpose Vehicles (or SPVs) that 
were run by Bear Stearns. SPVs are highly obscure i nan-
cial entities, and not much is known about them. Bear 
Stearns maintained two High-Grade open ended invest-
ment companies that invested in ABS), mortgage-backed 
securities, derivatives, options, swaps, futures, equities, 
and currencies. Funds that were registered as Cayman 
Islands exempted limited liability companies. h e funds 
were administered by PFPC Inc., a Massachusetts corpo-
ration, which administered the funds and performed all 
back oi  ce functions, including accounting and clerical 
operations. h e books and records of these funds were 
maintained and stored in Delaware, a state known as 
internal tax haven in the U.S. (Sharman 2011). Deloitte 
& Touché, Cayman Islands, performed the most recent 
audit of these funds. h e investment manager of this fund 
was Bear Stearns Asset Management Inc., a New York 
corporation („BSAM“) (United States District Court 
Southern District of New York, 2003).h e investor reg-
isters were held in Dublin, Ireland (another well-known 
tax haven) by an ai  liate of PFPC Inc. Two of the three 
investors in one of the Funds were registered in the Cay-
man Islands as well, but they were both Bear Stearns 
entities, which appear to have the same minimal Cayman 
Islands proi le as did the two Funds. Accounts receivable 
were located across Europe and the U.S.; counterparties 
to master repurchase and swap agreements were based 
both inside and outside the U.S., but none was in the 
Cayman Islands. 
h e courts concluded that the link between Cayman 
Islands and the two SPVs was tenuous. h e funds were 
registered in the Cayman, and had two (‘dummy’) direc-
tors that were residents of Cayman – but that was about 
it. Bear Stearns went into the trouble of setting up very 
complex structures, spanning many jurisdictions, paying 
hefty fees for licenses, professionals (lawyers, accountant, 
clerks), and the Cayman Islands dummy directors whose 
job was to do absolutely nothing. 
What exactly was the purpose of complex structures 
like the one maintained by Bear Stearns in the Caymans? 
h e concept of ‘dummy director’ is very popular. Mc-
Cabe’s (2012) analysis of 3,232 companies with an ad-
dress at the Irish Financial Services Sector (IFSC) named 
individuals, each sitting on the boards of hundreds of 
companies, a lucrative business for these individuals. h e 
Irish stockbroker i rm A&L Goodbody is company secre-
tary for 1,088 companies, including aircraft leasing i rm, 
banks, investment funds, asset management, real estate 
and energy. Matsack Trust limited is a company secretary 
for 1,295 companies, and so on. Clearly Goodbody and 
Matsack cannot possibly execute their task as company 
secretary in any meaningful way for any of those compa-
nies. Similar i ndings for large scale brass plate companies 
are found in the Netherlands and in Cayman. 
Why then, set up these complex and expensive struc-
tures that on surface, do not appear to be the most ef-
i cient way of allocating scarce resources? h ere were a 
number of reasons for doing so. First and foremost, of -
shore SPVs facilitate tax neutrality, or tax optimization. 
In Veblenian language, that amounts to sabotaging your 
government. h e idea of tax minimization is so wide-
spread and built in into our psyche that it is not even 
seen as problem. h e problem arises, however, when the 
i nancial system implodes, as it did in 2008, requiring the 
state to bail it out. But it is the same i nancial system that 
already weakened the state to the point at which bailing 
out the i nancial system led to very large sovereign debt 
crisis which ultimately damages the ability of the state to 
sustain the economy which i nance feeds upon.
Our own research into the uses of of shore SPVs re-
vealed a further purpose of sabotage. In the now well-
known bankruptcy case involving a British bank, North-
ern Rock, a Jersey-based SPV called Granite Master Trust 
was used by the bank to ef ect a sham process called ‘true 
sale.’ True sale tends to means dif erent things in dif-
ferent jurisdictions, but essentially it refers to exchange 
between two entities that do not share common owner-
ship. h e idea is that when two separate entities trade 
assets they will do so for good economic reasons, hence, 
the trade may be considered as ‘true sale’ as opposed to 
the very common intra-company trade that take place 
world-wide. Rating agencies were prepared to rate only 
the products that were sold in the markets under ‘true 
sale’ arrangements. h e beauty of of shore SPVs was that 
that no one was able to know for sure who were the 
ultimate owners and benei ciaries of assets or the SPV, 
as was the case of Northern Rock (and we have learned 
subsequently, many other banks). Hence, i nancial houses 
could ‘sell’ a product ef ectively to themselves or to the 
entities they controlled of shore at any price they wish to 
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cite, and the apparent ‘true sale’ would serve as pointer 
for other trades that would then follow the original true 
sale (Nesvetailova & Palan 2012). Was it an act of rogue 
behaviour by some marginal i nancial actors, or was it 
an act of Veblenian sabotage typical of the industry as 
a whole? Complexity was introduced, as in many other 
instances in i nance, in order to fool gullible investors. 
Incredibly though, as Veblen noted, it is not illegal, even 
if not in the spirit of the law. 
Andy Haldane of the Bank of England calculates 
that the ‘natural’ size of large bank, that is the natural 
size of the ei  cient standard economics banking entity, 
is about $US 100 billion of assets (Haldane 2012). Yet, 
many banks evolved somehow into much larger entities, 
some of them had over US$ 1 trillion of assets. Why is 
that? Veblenians point out that size had become a prime 
technique of sabotaging both the state and competitors. 
In the leverage game, banks learned that size does mat-
ter, for three related reasons. First, the market factored 
in their ‘too big to fail’, which meant that companies 
could now garner lower rates of interest in the ‘open mar-
kets’ because the markets factored in sovereign support 
to them. Haldane calculates that the combined advantage 
of being too big to fail gave these institutions discounted 
interest rates that would account collectively to about 
$US 70 billion annually before the crisis. 
Second, and more directly, size combined with lever-
age has increased their economic leverage and apparent 
proi t (Mester 2005; Mishkin 2006). h e proi ts were 
sustainable however, only for as long as the boom con-
tinued. When the music stopped playing, the complex 
interconnections and the size of leverage created during 
the boom years, brought down large banking houses and 
the banking system as a whole. h e link between appar-
ent performance during good times and the impact of 
potential losses during a crisis is the third technique of 
sabotaging by size. Size, or systemic signii cance widely 
understood, appears to give immunity, in a very broad 
sense, to i nancial institutions. Our banks have become 
not only too big to fail, but also too big to jail (Alessandri 
& Haldane 2009; Mishkin 2006; Pennacchi 2000). Eric 
H. Holder, Jr., U.S. attorney general, has noted the failure 
to prosecute multinational banks for various transgres-
sions during the recent boom: „I am concerned that the 
size of some of these institutions becomes so large that it 
does become dii  cult for us to prosecute them when we 
are hit with indications that if we do prosecute – if we do 
bring a criminal charge – it will have a negative impact on 
the national economy, perhaps even the world economy“ 
(Henning 2012). Analysing the possible lessons of such a 
crisis, Veblen warned that 
„the abruptness of the recapitalization and of 
the redistribution of ownership involved in a 
period of liquidation may be greatly mitigated, 
and the incidence of the shrinkage of values 
may be more equally distributed, by a 
judicious leniency on the part of the creditors 
or by a well-advised and discreetly weighted 
extension of credit by the movement to 
certain sections of the business community“ 
[Veblen 1904, 205].
It appears that the age of i nancial innovation has 
stretched Veblen’s notion of such mitigation to extreme. 
A study conducted by the New York State Attorney of-
i ce in the midst of the crisis presents an analysis of the 
‘Heads I Win, tails Your Lose’ bank bonus culture, speci-
fying in detail the size of bonus packages paid out by the 
banks who were the recipients of Troubled Asset Relief 
Program (TARP) scheme in 2008. h e summary of the 
investigation is simple enough: „When banks did well, 
their employees were paid well. When banks did poorly, 
their employees were paid well. And when banks did very 
poorly, they were bailed out by taxpayers and their em-
ployees were still paid well. Bonuses and overall compen-
sation did not vary signii cantly as proi ts diminished“ 
(Cuomo 2009, 1). 
Conclusion 
Many important developments in the i nancial system, 
including i nancial crises and major regulatory shifts, are 
often interpreted as outcomes of tensions between i nance 
and the ‘real’ economy. ‘Finance’ is often believed to be 
no longer embedded in the ‘real’ economy of production, 
trade and services, and this gulf is seen to have long-
reaching and destructive consequences. Within such in-
terpretations, the i nancial system is also commonly be-
lieved to be powerful in its autonomy: the banking sector 
and the i nancial industry are able to co-opt the political 
and social priorities of the state, with inl uential i nancial 
lobbies shaping the agenda of governance, nationally and 
internationally. 
While suggestive, such explanations tell only part of 
the story of the coni guration of i nancial power and the 
developments of the i nancial system. Part of the limi-
tations of juxtapositions of i nance and the ‘real’ econ-
omy and politics, is the underlying assumption that the 
sphere of i nance operates according to very particular 
logic and set of incentives prioritising short-termism and 
easy gains. Taking issue with such conceptual disjuncture 
accounts of i nance broadly and of the recent i nancial 
crisis in particular, in this article we have inquired into 
the apparent autonomy of i nance vis-à-vis the rest of the 
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political economic system by focusing on the emergence 
and growing of two ill-understood pillars of the global 
i nancial system: shadow banking and of shore i nancial 
havens. 
h e article, in other words, has sought to address 
the question of the causes of the quest for spatial dif-
ferentiation and being in regulatory spaces elsewhere. 
Recognizing the limits of mainstream economic models 
in answering this question, we have drawn on the ideas 
of h orstein Veblen and his theory of business civilisa-
tion. A Veblenian analysis of this development suggests 
that the behaviour in i nance that is commonly associated 
with human failure (greed, evasion, fraud), became wide-
spread practice, and can be best understood as sabotage in 
Veblenian terms. It amounted to techniques of sabotag-
ing clients and the governments who enacted regulations 
that were supposed to protect the clients. h ese were legal 
mechanisms, albeit as Veblen writes, not in the spirit of 
the law. 
Grinberg, I 2012, Beyond FATCA: An Evolutionary Moment for the In-
ternational Tax System, Georgetown Law: h e Scholarly Commons, 
Washington D.C.
Haldane, A., 2012, „On being the right size“, speech given at the Insti-
tute of Economic Af airs, the Beesley Lectures, 25 October. 
Henning, P 2012, After Financial Crisis, Prosecutors Navigate Tricky 
Waters. New York Times dealbook, 13 March. 
Henri, J 2012, h e Price of Of shore Revisited: A Review of Methods and 
Estimates for ‘missing’ Global Private Wealth, Income, Inequality, and 
Lost Taxes. s.l., s.n.
Hodgson, G 2004, h e Evolution of Institutional Economics, Routledge, 
London. 
McCabe, Conor, 2012, Snapshots of the Modus Operandi of the Irish 
Financial Service Sector, h e Irish Left Review, http://www.irish-
leftreview.org/2012/08/14/snapshots-modus-operandi-irish-i nancial-
services-sector/#sthash.MhXKplGY.dpuf
McCulley, P. 2009, „h e Shadow banking System and Hyman Min-
sky’s Economic Journey“, Global Central Bank Focus, PIMCO, 
May. 
Mehrling, P. 2012) Shadow banking, Central banking, and the Future 
of Global Finance, November.
Murphy, R. 2009, „Dei ning the Secrecy World. Rethinking the lan-
guage of ‘of shore’, Tax Justice Network. 
Nesvetailova, A. and R. Palan, 2013, ‘Sabotage in the Financial Sys-
tem: Lessons from Veblen’, Business Horizons, July, online i rst. 
Palan, R 2003, h e Of shore World: Sovereign Markets, Virtual Places, 
and Nomad Millionaires, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y.
Palan, R 2010, ‘Financial Centers: h e British Empire, City-States and 
Commercially-Oriented Politics’, h eoretical Inquiries in Law, vol. 
11, no.1, pp. 142-167.
Palan, R; Murphy, R & Chavagneux, C 2010 Tax Havens: How Glo-
balization Really Works, Cornell University Press, Ithaca.
Pozsar, Z., T. Adrian, A. Ashcraft and H. Boesky, 2010, „h e Shadow 
Banking System“, h e Federal Reserve Bank of New York. 
Schenk, C.R 1998, ‘h e Origins of the Eurodollar Market in London 
1955-63’, Explorations in Economic History,vol. 2, no.1, pp. 1-19.
Sharman, J.C., 2006, Havens in a Storm: h e Struggle for Global Tax 
Regulation, Cornell University Press, Ithaca.
Sharman J.C., 2011. „Testing the Global Financial Transparency Re-
gime“, International Studies Quarterly, 54, December.
Seabrooke, L & Wigan, D 2013, ‘Emergent Entrepreneurs in Transna-
tional Advocacy Networks: Professional Mobilization in the Fight 
for Global Tax Justice’, GR:EEN Working Paper Series, Working 
Paper No. 41.
Sylla, R 2002, ‘United States Banks and Europe: Strategy and Atti-
tudes’, in S Richard, UEuropean Banks and the American Challenge: 
Competition and Cooperation in International Banking Under Bretton 
Woods, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Tett, G., 2009, Fool’s Gold, New York: Free Press. 
Turner, A 2012, ‘Shadow Banking and Financial Instability’, Cass 
Business School Lecture, 14 March. 
Urry, J Forthcoming, Of shoring. Polity, Oxford.
Veblen, T 1923, Absentee Ownership and Business enterprise in Recent 
Times: h e Case of America, Beacon Press, Boston.
Veblen, T 1921, h e Engineer and the Price System, Batouche Publish-
ing, Kitchener. 
Veblen, T 1904, h e h eory of Business Enterprise, Augustus M Kelley, 
Clifton, NY. 
Zaring, D 2013, h e Financial Crisis in the Courts. New York Times 
dealbook, 7 January.
Notes
1. We would like to thank Amin Samman, Jeppe Strandsbjerg and 
Duncan Wigan for their comments on an earlier version of this 
paper.
Bibliography
Adrian, T; Begalle, B; Copeland, A & Martin, A 2011, „Repo and 
Securities Lending“, Staf  Report No. 529. Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York.
Amato, M & Fantacci, L 2012, h e End of Finance, Polity Press, Ox-
ford. 
Bakk-Simon, K; Borgioli, S; Giron, C; Hempell, H; Maddaloni, 
A; Recine, F & Rosati, S 2012, „Shadow Banking in the Euro 
Area. An Overview“, ECB Occasional paper Series, No. 133, April, 
European Central Bank. 
Best, J. 2005, h e Limits of Transparency, Ambiguity and the History of 
International Finance, Cornell UP. 
Buehn, A & Schneider, F 2012, „Shadow economies around the world: 
novel insights, accepted knowledge, and new estimates“, Interna-
tional Tax and Public Finance, Vol. 19, pp. 139–171. 
BIS 2009, Report on Special Purpose Entities, Bank of International Set-
tlement, Basle.
Bryant, R C1983, Eurocurrency Banking: Alarmist Concerns and 
Genuine Issues. OECD Economic Studies, vol. 1.
Burn, G 2005, Re-Emergence of Global Finance, Palgrave, London.
Cuomo, A. 2009, „No Rhyme or Reason. h e ‘Heads I Win, Tails you 
Lose’ Bonus Cultiore“, Soicla Repsort, Attorney General, State of 
New York. , 
Dosi, G 1991, Some h oughts on the Promises, Challenges and Dan-
gers of an ‘Evolutionary Perspective’ in Economics. Journal of Evo-
lutionary Economics, vol. 1, pp. 5-7.
Ghosh, S., I. Gonzalez del Mazo, and İnci Ötker-Robe, 2012, Chas-
ing the Shadows: How Signii cant Is Shadow Banking in Emerging 
Markets?, Economic Premise, No. 88, the World Bank. 
